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COMMENT 
AN INTEGRATIVE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR AMERICA'S PRIVACY TORTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 a Colorado federal court dismissed a woman's invasion-of-
privacy claim against her former employer. 1 In her privacy claim, Hieu 
Smith relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's recognition of the 
invasion-of-privacy tort a quarter-century earlier in Rugg v. McCarthy,2 
which stated, "We do not attempt to comprehensively define the right of 
privacy, nor to categorize the character of all invasions which may 
constitute a violation of such right. We merely observe that considerable 
precedent exists in the area of oppressive conduct by a creditor in 
connection with his effort to collect from his debtor.,,3 In dismissing 
Hieu Smith's privacy claim, the federal court in Smith v. Colo. Interstate 
Gas Co. did categorize the character of actionable invasions by holding 
that the right to privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the 
I Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D. Colo. 1991). Smith's 
complaint also asserted that her firing by the defendant, which she alleged was an act of gender and 
ethnic discrimination, was a violation of her civil rights. The privacy count alleged that the 
defendant violated her right to privacy by contacting her new temporary employer to disclose that 
she had filed a complaint for retaliatory firing, by suggesting that the temporary employer check the 
accuracy of the information on her employment application, and by subsequently confirming that the 
statement on Smith's application that she had been laid off by the defendant was not accurate. As a 
result Smith was dismissed from her temporary position and denied a permanent position. 
2 Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. 1970). Rugg alleged that a debt collector 
invaded her privacy through numerous telephone calls, letters demanding payment, and a letter to 
her employer indicating she was not fulfilling her expectations and inquiring how many 
garnishments would be tolerated. The trial court dismissed the privacy claim, but it was unclear if 
the decision was based upon non-recognition of the privacy tort, the inability of the complaint to 
meet the requirements of the tort, or both. The Colorado Supreme Court reinstated the privacy claim 
and remanded the case. 
3/d. at 755. 
71 
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seclusion of another, (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, or (d) 
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public.4 Over Smith's unsupported assertion that the privacy tort 
encompasses all affronts to one's dignity, the privacy cause of action was 
dismissed because it did not fit any of those four invasions.5 
Rugg and Smith encapsulate a transition between two approaches to 
tort protection of privacy. 6 Rugg reflects the unitary-tort theory, which 
recognizes a single tort and seeks only to determine if the plaintiff's 
interest in privacy has been breached by the defendant's behavior. 7 
Smith reflects the multiple-tort approach that recognizes four torts, 
encompassing four ways in which privacy is breached, that have in 
common only an interference with a loosely defined understanding of 
privacy. 8 This understanding of the privacy tort was lifted from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which adopted a construct first 
proffered by Dean William Prosser in a 1960 law review article. 9 
Beyond the mechanical issue of whether one or mUltiple torts are 
recognized, the fundamental question is whether either approach 
facilitates the identification of a single value that is protected by the tort. 
The unitary-tort approach treats privacy itself as that value, while the 
multiple-tort theory, reflected in the Prosser article and the Restatement, 
4 Smith, 777 F. Supp. at 857. 
5 1d. 
6 Classification of legal concepts has long been an exercise fraught with peril. In 1782, 
Jeremy Bentham noted, "there is no neutral term which can be applied in common to the ideas 
denoted by the words general and particular, so as to bring to view the one without putting an 
exclusion upon the other. [This]... is a sort of verbal contradiction which however it seemed 
impossible to avoid." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 161 n.1 (Charles 
Warren Everett ed., Greenwood Press 1970). Bentham fortunately used "particular" and "general" 
rather than his preferred "atomoprosetic" and "eidoprosetic." Id. Almost two centuries later, 
Professor Ruth Gavison, distinguishing between types of laws that protect rights, classified 
protections as falling into the "adjustment," "piecemeal," "general remedy," or "declaration of right" 
approach. See Ruth Gavison, Should We Have a "General Right to Privacy" in Israel?," 12 ISR. L. 
REV. 155, 158-59 (1977). Another approach focuses on the character of the tort at issue and 
distinguishes between the "Prosser Four-Part Analysis," the "Unified Tort Theory," and the 
"Unneeded Tort Theory." Jacqueline Hanson Dee, The Absence of False Light From the Wisconsin 
Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 99, 104-08 (1982). The "unitary" and "mUltiple tort" labels used 
here are adapted from the classifications used by Dee. 
7 See Rugg, 476 P.2d at 753. See also Dee, supra note 6, at 105-07. 
8 Smith, 777 F. Supp. at 857. Dee refers to this approach as the "Prosser Four Tort 
Analysis." Dee, supra note 6, at 105-07. In adopting this classification for use here, I refer more 
generally to a multiple-tort theory to focus on the aspect of the approach that envisions multiple torts 
for multiple invasions of privacy, thus holding out the possibility of additional torts for additional 
invasions of privacy, as envisioned by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 CAL L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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views the single value in privacy as an illusory umbrella that embraces 
four loosely linked, independent concerns. to 
The multiple-tort approach has been dominant in the United States 
over the last four decades, and the proponents of the unitary-tort 
approach have become a minority voice. II The Restatement, however, 
envisioned that the further development of the privacy tort would see 
additional invasions of privacy incorporated into Prosser's four-tort 
structure. 12 This has not occurred, and additional privacy torts have 
generally been created by statute to respond to specific threats. 13 In the 
absence of the flexibility envisioned by the Restatement, the debate over 
the privacy tort has generally been oriented around the two approaches 
manifested in Rugg and Smith. Adherents of the unitary-tort theory view 
the four-tort approach as a corruption of what the privacy tort was 
intended to be. 14 Those supporting the multiple-tort theory, however, 
believe that the four-tort approach clarifies the conceptual confusion 
created by the privacy tort's unitary theory origins. 15 Its ascendance 
notwithstanding, the Restatement's four -tort structure, has stunted the 
development of both approaches' ability to evolve and adapt to emerging 
threats. 16 
This Comment argues that the flexibility envisioned by the 
Restatement can best be achieved through an alternative offered by the 
Government of Ireland in the summer of 2006. 17 The Irish proposal 
recognizes a single tort for invasion of privacy, defining the degree of 
privacy that an individual may expect as that which is reasonable under 
all the circumstances. 18 It lists a series of factors to consider when 
evaluating all the circumstances, as well as defenses and recognized 
violations. 19 The Irish integrative approach seeks to incorporate the 
elasticity of the unitary-tort approach with the clarity of the multiple-tort 
approach in a single statute. Adoption of the Irish approach would allow 
American jurisdictions to more clearly articulate the privacy tort and to 
10 See infra notes 29-60 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise indicated, references to 
the "Restatement" referto the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § (1977). 
II See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 127-136 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 29-48 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text. 
17 See GOy'T OF IRELAND, REPORT OF WORKING GROUP ON PRIVACY (2006) (available from 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Refonn website) at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/WkgGrpPri vacy. pdf/Files/WkgGrpPrivacy. pdf. 
18 [d. 'II 7.13-14, app. § 3(1). 
19 [d. 'II 7.13, app. § 3(2); 'II 7.22, app. § 6( I )(a-d); 'II 7.17, app. § 4( I )(a-d). 
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better channel the adaptive powers of American common law. 2o Part I of 
this Comment explains that modern American privacy-tort law is the 
result of the tension between two conflicting viewpoints on invasion-of-
privacy torts.21 Part II shows how the widespread acceptance of the four-
tort structure in the United States has stunted the development of the 
privacy tort.22 Part III surveys the provisions of the Irish proposal, while 
Part IV analyzes the benefits offered by the Irish integrative approach. 23 
Part V explores how an American jurisdiction can utilize a structure like 
that in the Irish bill to take advantage of these benefits.24 Finally, Part VI 
concludes that the Irish proposal offers an opportunity for American 
privacy-tort jurisprudence to embrace the adaptive and evolutionary 
power of the common law.25 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN PRN ACY TORT 
The American privacy tort has changed significantly from its 
origins as a broadly drawn protection and has been transmuted into a 
compartmentalized four-tort structure that prevails today.26 This has had 
the practical effect, as seen in Smith, of limiting privacy-tort protections 
to acts that fall within the parameters established by the four torts, and 
excluding those that fall outside that structure.27 The ascendance of the 
four-tort framework has fundamentally reordered both the form and the 
scope of the invasion-of-privacy torts, to the point that subsequent 
deviations from it have been tentative and isolated.28 
A. THE WARREN-BRANDEIS FRAMEWORK 
Perhaps the most famous law review article in history, The Right to 
Privacy by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, proposed the idea that 
privacy is the right to be left alone.29 It asserted that recognition of the 
right and a corresponding tort was required to ensure the individual's 
20 See infra notes 125-170 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 26-80 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 125-170 and 171-207 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 208-250 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 29-60 and accompanying text. 
27 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 49-56, 61-80 and accompanying text. 
29 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890); 
see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 635 (1834), ("defendant asks to be left alone ... "); THOMAS 
L. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (1888) (coining phrase "right to be left alone"). 
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"full protection in person and property.,,30 The common law, therefore, 
had to "meet the new demands of society" stemming from "instantaneous 
photographs and newspaper enterprises" that invaded "the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life" and from "numerous mechanical 
devices" that threatened to make the private pUblic. 31 The authors 
asserted that modern enterprise had, through invasion of the individual's 
privacy, "subjected him to mental pain and distress far greater than could 
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.'.32 Warren and Brandeis extended 
existing protections33 in the common law to create a "general right to the 
immunity of the person" that bore a "superficial resemblance" to an 
action for defamation, but unlike with defamation, the invasion was a 
legal injury in itself. 34 This new right was intended to protect an 
individual's "inviolate personality. ,,35 
Warren and Brandeis's understanding of "inviolate personality" was 
not clarified further,36 but since 1890 legions of scholars have attempted 
to bring greater clarity to the concept of privacy. Some have approached 
this as a definitional challenge and determined that privacy is the right to 
control information about oneself,37 a form of anti-totalitarianism,38 or a 
right to exclusion. 39 Others have viewed privacy as the embodiment of a 
value such as personhood4o or autonomy.41 Another approach has 
30 [d. at 193. 
31 [d. at 193-195. 
32 [d. at 196. 
33 These included, e.g., extension of the property rights in manuscripts and works of art to 
embrace "the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all" and 
the logic behind injunctions against publication on the basis of breach of contract and breach of trust 
to circumstances where there was no contract or relationship as akin to the implication of a term or 
relationship required to prevent "an intolerable abuse." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 199-
203,210. 
34 [d. at 207,197,213. 
35 [d. at 205. 
36 Brandeis appeared to attempt to offer some clarification on this matter in his famous 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States: "The makers of our Constitution .... [r]ecognized the 
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only part 
of the pain, pleasure, and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations." Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, at 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
37 ARTHUR R. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM 7 (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE. L.J. 475, 477·78 (1968). 
38 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,784 (1989). 
39 Russell Brown, Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law, 43 
ALBERTA L. REV. 589,591 (2006). 
40Daniei R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 91, 92 
(1989); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977); Jeffrey 
Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 33 (1976); Edward Bloustein, 
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional 
5
Connallon: Integrating the Privacy Tort
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
76 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
reduced privacy to a few essential components such as "secrecy, 
anonymity, and solitude,,42 or "repose, sanctuary, and intimate 
decision.,,43 In the tort context, defining privacy is a narrower aspect of 
this inquiry, concerned with determining what must be breached to give 
rise to a civil wrong for which the law offers a remedy.44 
By 1939, the notion that the right to privacy could be protected by a 
single integrative form of action had received significant acceptance.45 
That year, the First Restatement of Torts recognized that "[a] person who 
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not 
having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public 
is liable to the other.,,46 A hallmark early case, Pavesich v. New England 
Life Insurance CO.,47 stated that "the right to withdraw from the public 
gaze at such times as a person sees fit . . . is also embraced within the 
right of personalliberty.,,48 This embrace of privacy as a single, unitary 
concept was indicative of Warren and Brandeis's success in integrating 
the strands of the cases they analyzed into a new, unified legal tort 
protection. 
B. PROSSER AND THE RESHAPING OF PRN ACY 
This new tort protection was significantly reshaped by another well-
known law review article. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, in 
recognizing the familiar four-tort structure, accepted a construct first 
posited in Dean William Prosser's 1960 article entitled simply Privacy.49 
as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611, 619 (1968). 
41 Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974); Joel 
Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 445,467-77 (1983). 
42 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.1. 421, 433 (1980). 
43 Gary L. Bostwick, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 
CAL. L. REv. 1447,1451 (1976). 
44 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a tort as "a civil wrong for 
which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages"). 
45 As early as 1902, when the New York Court of Appeals held in Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902), that there was no common-law right to privacy, the 
public outcry was so strong that one of the majority judges felt compelled to defend the opinion in a 
law review article. See Dennis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437, 437-38 
(1902). For a history of privacy from 1890 to 1990, see Ken Gormley, 100 Years of Privacy, 1992 
WIS. L. REV. 1335 (1992). 
46 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
47 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing a breach of 
an artist's right to privacy when an insurance company published his picture next to that of an 
obviously sick man in an endorsement). 
48 1d. 
49 Prosser, supra note 9, at 383; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
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Prosser sought to "inquire what interest we are protecting, and against 
what conduct," and his conclusions were based upon "something over 
three hundred cases in the books.,,5o He argued that what had emerged 
was not one tort, but a complex of four, protecting against "four distinct 
kinds of invasions of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are 
tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in 
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the 
plaintiff. .. 'to be let alone. ",51 Prosser viewed the confusion about 
Warren and Brandeis's invocation of inviolate personality as requiring 
the separating and distinguishing of the four torts that he identified. 52 
With the Restatement's incorporation of the Prosser view, the 
ascendance of the torts of intrusion, 53 false-light publicity,54 disclosure 
of private facts, 55 and appropriation,56 and the required elements for each, 
became institutionalized into the American legal landscape. 
The impact of Prosser's framework is both wide and deep. Almost 
everyone of America's fifty-four jurisdictions has accepted at least one 
of the four torts.57 Prosser's formulation has been the starting point for 
50 Prosser, supra note 9, at 388-89. 
51 [d. 
52 [d. at 407. 
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6528 (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person."). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as 
to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed."). 
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)("One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not oflegitimate concern to the pu blic."). 
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use 
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy."). 
57 The fifty-four jurisdictions are the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands. Only North Dakota has declined to recognize any of the 
four torts. South Dakota, Guam, and Puerto Rico have neither recognized nor declined to recognize 
any of the four. Wyoming has declined to recognize the misappropriation tort and has neither 
recognized nor declined to adopt the other three. All four torts have been recognized in twenty-nine 
jurisdictions, with fourteen accepting three of the torts, two accepting two of the torts, and three 
accepting one of them. The intrusion-against-seclusion tort has been recognized by forty-six 
jurisdictions, the misappropriation tort by forty-five, the private-facts tort by forty-two, and the false-
light tort by thirty-two. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW 
2006-07 1647-55 (2006). 
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the consideration of privacy-tort law in decades' worth of judicial 
decisions.58 The Supreme Court of Connecticut, for example, recognized 
the four torts while summarily adopting the Prosser statement that the 
privacy tort did not develop as a single tort, but a complex of four. 59 
This pattern, taken to its logical conclusion, has resulted in courts 
deciding privacy cases on whether the facts fit one of the recognized 
torts, not on whether the interest breached is one for which society seeks 
to provide a remedy.60 
C. MODERN DEVIATION FROM THE MULTIPLE-TORT THEORY 
The ascendance of the multiple-tort approach appears also to have 
constrained the employment of other mechanisms to create forms that 
deviate from it. Both the recognition of a right to privacy in a state 
constitution and the enactment of a state privacy statute offer the 
opportunity for a legislature to deviate from the multiple-tort approach. 
Only one state, however, has employed those mechanisms to move 
beyond the four-tort approach.61 
Ten states have incorporated declarations of a right to privacy into 
their state constitutions.62 In all but one, though, this declaration has no 
impact on tort law. 63 Only in California does the constitutional 
58 See, e.g., Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 896 (Colo. 2002) (declining to recognize 
the false-light-publicity tort because it overlaps with defamation); Hougum v. VaHey Mem'l 
Hospital, 574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1998) (declining to recognize any of the four torts); 
Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 n.12 (R.I. 1997) (noting that Rhode Island recognizes 
only a statutory right to privacy); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234-36 (Minn. 
1988) (recognizing all but the false-light tort); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 
405, 410 (N.C. 1984) (declining to recognize the false-light-publicity tort). But see Anderson v. 
Fisher Broad. Co., 712 P.2d 803, 808 (Or. 1986) ("The exact formulations of the Restatement are not 
necessarily authoritative statements of the law of this state .... "). 
59 Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982) 
(quoting Prosser, supra note 9, at 383). 
60 See Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854,857 (D. Colo. 1991); Dwyer v. 
American Express Corp., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (dismissing a misappropriation 
claim against a credit card company for selling lists of consumers classified into demographic groups 
because the information lacked intrinsic value). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 
1999) (defining a tort as "a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. [sic] in the form of 
damages"). 
61 See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. 
62 Four explicitly declare a right to privacy: Ala. Const. art. I, § 22; Cal. Const. art. I , § I; 
Haw. Const. art. I, § 6; Mont. Const. art. II, § 10. Three provide that the individual shall be secure 
against invasions of privacy: Ill. Const. art. I, § 6; La. Const. art. I, § 5; S. C. Const. art. I, § 10. 
Two declare that no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs: Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8; Wash. 
Const. art. I, § 7; Florida's Constitution provides that "every natural person has the right to be let 
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life." Fla. Const. art. I, § 23. 
63 See, e.g., Resha v. Tucker, 670 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1996); Cape Pub., Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 
8
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recognition of a right to privacy support a corresponding tort cause of 
action.64 A declaration of a right to privacy was incorporated into the 
California Constitution through a voter initiative in 1972.65 In 1975, the 
California Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provision provided 
a cause of action in tort available to all Californians.66 The court's 
decision was based upon the text of a brochure from supporters of the 
initiative stating that the provision would create a legally enforceable 
right to privacy. 67 
Just as state constitutional protections have done little to upset the 
ascendance of the four-tort approach, state privacy statutes creating tort 
causes of action have shown little deviation from the Restatement 
architecture. Nineteen states have enacted tort protections against 
invasions of privacy. 68 In ten of these states the statutes protect only 
property-like interests in name or likeness through authorizing tort 
recovery for misappropriation or breach of the right to pUblicity.69 Five 
so. 2d 1374, 1377 (Ra. 1989); Forsberg v. Housing Auth., 455 So. 2d 373, 374 (Ra. 1984) 
(Overton, J., concurring); see also Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342-43 (Wash. 1998) 
(declining to recognize a civil cause of action based upon the constitutional protection). 
64 See Cal. Const. art. I, § I ("All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."). 
65 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975). 
66 [d. at 775. 
67 The brochure stated, "At present there are no effective restraints on the information 
activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of 
privacy for every Californian." [d. at 774. California courts had long used such material to clarify 
the intent behind measures adopted by initiative. See, e.g., Carter v. Comm'n on Qualifications of 
Judicial Appointments, 93 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1939); Beneficial Loan Soc'y Ltd. v. Haight, II P.2d 
857,860 (Cal. 1932); Story v. Richardson, 198 P. 1057, 1059 (Cal. 1921). 
68 California, Rorida, II1inois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin. 
69 Rorida, Ra. Stat. Ann. §§ 540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Special 'A' Sess.); 
II1inois, 765 III. Compo Stat. Ann. § 1075 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Indiana, Ind. Code 
Ann. §§ 32-13-1-1 to 32-13-1-20 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Kentucky, I Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 391.170 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess.); Nevada, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.770 to 597.810 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); New York, N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2007, ch. 2); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 2741.01 to 2741.09 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 
839.1 to 839.4, 1448-1449 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Extraordinary Sess.); 
Pennsylvania, 46 Pa. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8316 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Act 151); Tennessee, 
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Reg. Sess.); 
Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 26.001 to 26.015 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2006 3rd Called Sess.); 
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to 45-3-6 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Virginia, 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Special Sess. I); Washington, WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 63.60.010 to 63.60.080 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess. Ch. 2). The 
misappropriation tort is one of the four torts identified by Prosser and recognized in the Restatement. 
See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. The right of publicity was created in an effort to 
9
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states' statutes move beyond misappropriation and publicity, with all 
four Prosser torts codified in the Nebraska and Rhode Island statutes, 
while the Wisconsin statute codifies three and the California statute 
codifies two. 70 
Massachusetts, the fifth state to move beyond misappropriation and 
publicity, is different. In addition to codifying a misappropriation 
protection, the commonwealth has a statutory tort protection of privacy 
apparently untouched by Prosser and the Restatement. 71 It provides, "A 
person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial, or serious 
interference with his privacy."n While the Massachusetts courts have 
also recognized the general substance of the private-facts and intrusion 
torts, but not the false-light tort, they have done so without extending 
explicit recognition of a common-law privacy protection.73 Instead, they 
distinguish one's ability to exclusively control the commercial use of name, likeness, or other 
distinct characteristic from the misappropriation tort. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). The breach of the right of publicity tort is generally 
applicable only to plaintiffs who have achieved some fame or notoriety. See White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 
(5th Cir. 1994); Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Despite its origins in an 
effort to distinguish it from the privacy torts, it is frequently treated as an aspect of privacy, owing to 
its close relationship to the misappropriation tort. See VIcrOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, 
DAVID F. PARTLETI, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, liTH. ED. XVIII, 939-984 (2005); 
JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS IX, 724-749 (200 I). 
70 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-211, 25-840.01 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second 
Reg. Sess.). R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to 9-1-28.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
Wisconsin foregoes the false light tort. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West, Westlaw current through 
2005 Act 491). California codifies an intrusion, misappropriation, and publicity tort. CAL CIY. 
CODE §§ 1708.8,3344,3344.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
71 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 417 of 2006 2nd 
Annual Sess.) (codifying the misappropriation cause of action). 
72 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § IB (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 417 of 2006 2nd 
Annual Sess.). 
73 For recognition of the private-facts tort, see Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Mass. 
1984) (interpreting § 1B as prohibiting "disclosure of facts ... of a highly personal or intimate nature 
when there is no countervailing interest."); Haggerty v. Globe Newspaper, 419 N.E. 2d 844, 845 
(Mass. 1981) (holding that allegation of publication of decade-old investigative materials "just 
barely succeeds" in stating claim). For recognition of the intrusion tort, see Schlesinger v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912, 916 (Mass. 1991) (addressing intrusion theory 
for the first time under § IB and holding that infrequent telephone solicitations are not a privacy 
violation); Cort v. Bristol Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908. 913-14 (Mass. 1982) (recognizing the 
intrusion tort and holding that an employer's questionnaire did not violate employee's right to 
privacy). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to recognize the false-light tort in 
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 682 n.16 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
397 (2005), and Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989) ("The 
only invasion ... the plaintiffs assert is ... 'false light.' This court has not recognized that tort and 
does not choose to do so now."). While the Supreme Judicial Court has devoted significant effort to 
defining the contours of the statutory protection, it has declined to address whether there are 
corresponding non-statutory protections. See Tower v. Hirschhorn, 492 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Mass. 
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have grounded their judgments in the two statutes, which thus provide a 
right of recovery independent of the four-tort construct.74 The 
Massachusetts statutes, coupled with this decisional law,75 have had the 
practical effect of melding the Prosser torts of private facts, intrusion, 
and misappropriation with a unitary-tort theory cause of action. 
The deviations in California and Massachusetts are isolated, and 
there is little, if any, indication that these approaches might be duplicated 
elsewhere. They do suggest that assessment of the privacy tort is a more 
dynamic consideration than the Restatement suggests, but not by much. 
Privacy torts have come to be viewed through intellectual shorthand in 
which "Warren and Brandeis" equal the right to be left alone, "Prosser" 
equals four torts, and California and Massachusetts do not bear 
mentioning.76 This shorthand suggests a strictly linear view in which 
Prosser's work is a refinement of Warren and Brandeis's.77 Another 
1986) ("We have declined to determine whether there is a comparable non-statutory claim in tort for 
invasion of privacy."). 
74 See Schlesinger, 567 N.E.2d at 916; Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 438 n.9. 
75 See supra note 73. 
76 See JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS IX, 724-749 (2001). VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, 11 m 
ED. XVIII, 939-84 (2005). In both texts, the chapters dealing with privacy torts initially introduce 
the Warren and Brandeis concept and then are organized according to the Prosser taxonomy. The 
California and Massachusetts approaches are not mentioned. 
77 A strictly linear approach that assumes that what follows is a refinement and improvement 
of what preceded fails to allow for any pragmatism in the development of the law. In 1887, Harvard 
Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell stated that "law is a science, and that all the 
available materials of that science are contained in printed books." C.C. Langdell, Address at the 
"Quarter-Millennial" Celebration of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1887),3 LAW Q. REv. 118, 124 
(1887). Included in this analogy of the law to science was an understanding that the point of science 
was to uncover truth, which was immutable. Such an approach, thus, sees the law as the product of 
neatly interlocking logical propositions. Grant Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: Our Legal History 
in a Time of Trouble, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 479 (1972). Oliver Wendell Holmes's maxim that 
"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience" is largely perceived as a broadside 
against Langdell's viewpoint. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963); see, e.g., 
Gilmore at 480; Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists 
and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1998). Decades after Holmes, Professor Grant Gilmore 
would view Langdell's approach as reflective of a "historicist" viewpoint that professes that the past 
can be arranged in a meaningful sequence that will not only explain the present but predict the 
future. Gilmore at 480. Gilmore responds to the historicists: "Let us all become historians; let us not 
become historicists." [d. at 484. Holmes, as Professor Gilmore explains, insisted that rules of law 
reflect social conditions and must change as those conditions change. [d. at 480. A strictly linear 
approach forgoes such a possibility because it assumes that what has been supplanted must be 
discarded, while the life of the law in experience includes the possibility that what has been 
supplanted may be what is again necessary to meet the prevailing social conditions. As Thomas S. 
Kuhn has noted, in reference to science, but in terms equally applicable to any field in which 
theories are developed and tested, "the textbook tendency to make the development of science linear 
hides a process that lies at the heart of the most significant episodes of scientific development." 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 140 (2nd ed. enlarged, 1970). 
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approach, though, views the modern arrangement as the result of the 
ongoing tension between the unitary- and multiple-tort theories.78 The 
implication of this second perspective is that an ascendant form is subject 
to challenge by the non-dominant form. 79 This, in turn, raises the 
possibility of the non-dominant form becoming the dominant form, or of 
an accommodation between the two.80 
II. THE STUNTED COMMON LAW TORT 
Beyond the separation and clarification that Prosser envisioned, the 
multiple-tort approach has also restrained the growth of privacy as a 
common law tort doctrine. 81 Not surprisingly, since the ascendance of 
78 The now familiar dynamic, explained by Dr. Kuhn, of the paradigm shift involves a 
fundamental change in the basic understanding of how a given field operates. See Kuhn, supra note 
77 at 77-173. Kuhn, embodying his traditional science perspective, described a paradigm as "some 
accepted examples of actual scientific practice-examples which include law, theory, application, 
and instrumentation together-provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research." Id. at 10. A paradigm shift occurs when a new theory explains inconsistencies 
between the old theory and observed conditions. Id. at 111-159. Such a shift occurs when a new 
theory is selected as the fittest way to practice in a field in the future. Id. at 172. While the 
development of legal doctrines does not rely on observation and empiricism to the extent that 
traditional science does, Kuhn's explanation of the process is no less illuminating in the legal arena 
than in the scientific arena. Because legal doctrines do not develop through the same processes of 
observation and testing as do scientific doctrines, the shift from the unitary- to multiple-tort 
approach to privacy, which may appear to be a paradigm shift, may actually be just part of the 
process oftesting competing approaches. 
79 As Kuhn envisioned it, a paradigm shift in one of the traditional sciences, once it occurs, 
must so profoundly resolve inconsistencies and change the nature of understanding that it is, 
essentially, irrevocable. Kuhn, supra note 77 at 144-60. Outside traditional sciences, the 
expectation is not quite as profound. Kuhn recognized that in the humanities there are always 
competing solutions that arise. Id. at 164-65. In a field like the law, where competing solutions are 
expected and are essential to the vitality of the system, the re-emergence of a previously discarded 
approach need not give rise to a theoretical crisis. Even when it does, though, it can easily be 
concluded, as in traditional science, that a paradigm shift has not occurred. Indeed, this Comment 
implicitly suggests that a paradigm shift with respect to privacy torts cannot have occurred through 
the ascendance of the multiple-tort theory, because that theory has not resolved the inconsistencies 
and problems attendant to its primacy. 
80 Kuhn's analysis suggests that true paradigm shifts do not occur in the law all that often. 
There is a democratic aspect to the law that Kuhn's scientific theory is not equipped to deal with. 
Each jurisdiction is empowered to make its own decision about how its tort laws will operate, and 
the notion that a given area of the law might be the object of a majority approach, a minority 
approach, and any number of other variations is unsurprising. This dynamic, seen through the prism 
of Kuhn's work, suggests that each area of the law is constantly engaged in the search for a new 
paradigm that only is validated when all, or at least most, jurisdictions adopt the same answers to the 
same questions. That there might be cycles of ascendance among theories in a given area, and 
attempts to accommodate between them, is evidence of the vitality with which these searches take 
place. 
81 Common law, as used here refers to the "body of law derived from judicial decisions, 
rather than from statutes or constitutions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7'" ed. 1999). It also 
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the Prosser argument in the 1960s and its validation in the Restatement in 
the 1970s, the common law has devoted scant attention to identifying the 
central value at the core of the unitary-tort approach to privacy. 82 
Somewhat surprisingly, though, the primacy of the multiple-tort theory 
appears also to have constrained the development of the multiple-tort 
approach to privacy envisioned by the Restatement.83 
America's common-law system, based upon judges' reliance on 
previous decisions, is supposed to yield a legal system that adapts to 
changes in society.84 This requires evaluating the context in which 
conduct occurs and determining whether it conforms to developed 
norms.85 As Professor Arthur Hogue stated, "[t]he survival of the 
[English] common law has depended in large part on the ability of its 
practitioners to adapt the legal system to new conditions .... ,,86 Since 
1960, this adaptability with respect to privacy has been restrained by the 
prevalence of the four-tort structure.87 The common law of privacy has 
scarcely adapted to new conditions and deviations from the multiple-tort 
theory embodied in the four torts have been tentative at best. 88 
A. RETARDING THE UNITARy-TORT APPROACH 
Not surprisingly, the ascendance of the multiple-tort approach of the 
Restatement has crowded out consideration of the central value 
underlying the right to privacy.89 Prosser and the Restatement view the 
refers to the method by which judges create that body of law through reliance on previous decisions. 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, WHAT Is THE COMMON LAW? 75 (1954). See also Prosser, supra note 9, at 
407, for Prosser's description of the purpose of his article. 
82 See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text. 
83 See infra notes 104-124 and accompanying text. 
84 See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 903 (Md. 1983) 
("The common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to keep pace with the 
world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.") (cited in 
M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 555, 555 (1996»; see also PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 177 (1979) ("They looked for the 
reason, which had made him decide the case the way he did, the ratio decidendi as it came to be 
called. Thus it was the principle of the case, not the words, which went into the common law."). 
85 Madden, supra note 84, at 561. 
86 ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 231 (1966) (quoted in Madden, supra 
note 84, at 593). 
87 See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 61-80, 89-124 and accompanying text. 
89 In South Dakota, for example, a privacy tort consistent with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 
867 (1939) was recognized in 1963 by the state supreme court in Truxes v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 119 
N.W.2d 914, 917 (S.D. 1963). In so doing, the court stated, "The common law of this state .. .is 
flexible and capable of adaptation to the needs and demands of changing times." Id. at 916. In 
1979, however, the court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977) four-tort 
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four torts as sharing little more than an ill-defined privacy labe1.90 The 
unitary-tort approach, by contrast, is grounded in the existence of a core 
privacy value. 91 The broad ascendance of the multiple-tort approach has 
largely relegated consideration of that central core to the work of 
academics.92 
Edward Bloustein expressed the unitary-tort position most starkly, 
stating that the consequence of Prosser's view "is that Warren and 
Brandeis were wrong and their analysis of the tort of privacy a 
mistake.,,93 He continued, "[i]nstead of a relatively new, basic and 
independent legal right protecting a unique, fundamental and relatively 
neglected interest, we find a mere application in novel circumstances of 
traditional legal rights designed to protect well-identified and established 
social values.,,94 Bloustein, thereby, concluded that Warren and Brandeis 
did indeed create a single right to privacy shielding the interest in 
preserving individual dignity, and that "the tort cases involving privacy 
are of one piece and involve a single tort.,,95 
Bloustein conceded that Warren and Brandeis "went very little 
beyond giving their right and their interest a name and distinguishing it 
from other rights or interests," but argued also that Warren and Brandeis 
did indicate the interest they sought to protect in their invocation of 
inviolate personality.96 Bloustein took this to mean one's "independence, 
dignity and integrity; it defines man's essence as a unique and self 
determining being.,,97 This view focuses on the moral right of the 
individual to define his or her own human existence and the 
transgression of that right that occurs when another party seeks to do so 
without consent. 98 
The problem with the focus on individual dignity is that the concept 
is so metaphysical that even proponents of the unitary-tort approach have 
questioned its utility.99 Other commentators have taken the same 
structure in defining what gave rise to a right to recover for invasion of privacy. Montgomery Ward 
v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 809 n.2 (S.D. 1979). 
90 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra notes 36-43, infra notes 100-103, and accompanying text. 
93 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Answer of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (1964). 
94 1d. at 965-966. 
95 1d. at 986, 1000. 
96 Id. at 970-71 (quoting Warren and Brandeis, supra note 29, at 205). 
97 Id. at 971. 
98 Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right to Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law's 
Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 539, 544-49 (1991). 
99 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 438 (1980) 
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approach as Bloustein and found different core principles. Some have 
found that the unifying principle is the autonomy to engage in one's own 
thoughts and to make one's own decisions. 100 Another perspective is that 
privacy is the right to decide when, how, and what information about 
them is communicated to others. 101 Still another expresses Warren and 
Brandeis's original concept as the right to be left alone, with respect to 
the acquisition and dissemination of information concerning the person, 
particularly through unauthorized publication, photography, or media.102 
Within this diversity, there is accord on the conclusion that a common 
thread exists. 103 The ascendance of the four torts has, however, largely 
relegated this discussion to the halls of law schools and the pages of law 
journals. 
B. RETARDING THE MULTIPLE-TORT APPROACH 
Prosser's four-tort structure was the result of his effort to "separate 
and distinguish" the common law of privacy up to 1960. Hl4 The 
Restatement contemplated development of its privacy-tort structure 
beyond that offered by Prosser, by recognizing that further court 
decisions and other references might recognize expansion of the four 
forms or establishment of new forms. 105 This view is consistent with the 
general concept of the common law discussed above. 106 
Adaptation has occurred to a certain extent through piecemeal 
creation of causes to cover additional invasions of privacy. 107 Congress 
has adopted a number of statutes prohibiting certain breaches of privacy 
and authorizing civil actions against alleged perpetrators, thus creating a 
number of mini-torts. These have included actions against those who 
("[Tlhere are ways to offend dignity and personality that have nothing to do with privacy."); 
Halpern, supra note 98, at 563 ("The law is probably not the appropriate vehicle for the furtherance 
of the 'inviolate personality."'). 
100 See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 
467-77 (1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,1425 (1974); Daniel 
R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 91, 92 (1989). 
101 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1978); Hyman Gross, The Concept of 
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1967). 
102 Gormley, supra note 45, at 1357. 
103 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
104 Prosser, supra note 9, at 407. 
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A note c (1977) ("further court decisions and 
other references may give rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability for invasion of 
privacy listed in this Section or the establishment of new forms. Nothing in this chapter is intended 
to exclude the possibility of future developments in the law of privacy."). 
106 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
107 Ruth Gavison, supra note 6, at 158. 
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I · . . 108 d' I d intercept e ectromc commumcatIons, ISC ose store 
communications,l09 and willfully violate Fair Credit Reporting Act 
privacy protections. ~IO This dynamic:: has been repeated in most states. 
California, for instance, authorizes civil actions by consumers suffering 
damages arising from unauthorized disclosure or use of credit 
information by credit reporting and investigative agencies, III 
unauthorized disclosure or use of personal medical information, 112 
disclosure of consumer information arising from a business's failure to 
destroy business records,113 and prohibited debt collection practices such 
as disclosure of the debt to a debtor's employer."4 Other states have 
authorized civil actions and damages for a range of privacy intrusions. 115 
Inherent in these protections is a judgment that a need for protection is 
not met by the existing torts. That they were adopted by statute and did 
not arise from the common law suggests that courts were either unwilling 
or unable to fashion protections against these privacy infringements. 
Rather than adapting to new threats to privacy, the common-law 
consideration of privacy torts has been confined to concerns that fall 
within the four-tort structure. In Joe Dickerson & Associates, LLC v. 
Dittmar, for instance, the Colorado Supreme Court formally recognized 
the appropriation-of-name-or-likeness tort and invalidated a jury 
instruction requiring that a plaintiff prove his or her name or likeness had 
value in order to recover personal damages. 116 With respect to the 
public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort, there has been considerable case 
law on the conditions under which an individual becomes a public figure 
108 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(a) (Westlaw 2007). 
109 18 U.S.C.A. § 2708 (Westlaw 2007). 
110 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681(n) (Westlaw 2007). 
III CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.31,1786.50 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also 
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785-1785.36 (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 
1786-1786.60 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
112 CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 56.35-36 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
113 CAL. ClY. CODE § 1798.84 (b)-(e) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL. 
CIv. CODE §§ 1798.80-84 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
114 CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 1788.30-33 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see also CAL. 
CIV.CODE§ 1788.12. 
115 See, e.g., Indiana P.L.ll5-2005 Vol. 3, § I (authorizing civil action and damages up to 
$\OO,OOO.for unauthorized installation of spyware); Delaware Session Laws Vol. 75: 61, § I 2005 
(authorizing civil action and treble damages for failure to provide notification of unauthorized 
acquisition of personal information). 
116 Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999 (Colo. 2001); see also CJI-
Civ. 4th 28:4 (2000). 
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to whom the tort is unavailable. 117 Further energy has been devoted to 
what is required to fulfill the publication requirement for the publicity 
and false-light torts. I IS Additionally, regarding the public-disclosure tort, 
there has been considerable litigation on the impact of the First 
Amendment. 119 The well-known case of Time, Inc. v. Hill laid down the 
Constitutional requirement that a false-light plaintiff prove that the 
defendant knew the statements published were false or acted with 
reckless disregard as to falsity. 120 While the Constitutional cases 
necessarily impact the scope of the protection, they are reflective of 
concerns raised by the Constitution, not by the ongoing development of 
the common law. 
Similarly, the development of privacy-tort law has been devoid of 
doctrinal adjustments that would allow courts to respond to new 
conditions. The development of comparative fault, the abandonment of 
the rule against spouses suing one another, the establishment of a 
117 See Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (prize fighter was public 
figure); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947), 
affd, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (symphony conductor was public figure); Martin v. 
Dorton, 50 So.2d 391,396 (Miss. 1951) (sheriff was public figure). In a similar line of cases, 
otherwise private figures were held to have been drawn into public events and to have become public 
figures in relation to those events. See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 977 (Ky. 1929) 
(plaintiffs husband murdered in front of her); Berg v. Minnesota Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 
957,962 (D. Minn. 1948) (plaintiff was in midst of divorce litigation); Stryker v. Republic Pictures 
Corp. 238 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (war hero); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 470 
(D.C. Cir.1946) (defendant in sedition trial). 
118 See Grigorenko v. Pauls, 297 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (D. Conn. 2003) (disclosure of 
plagiarism allegation to nine persons at university and three persons outside university insufficient 
for false-light claim); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 2003) 
(holding that dissemination of names and social security numbers of 204 employees to sixteen 
freight-terminal manages in six states did not constitute publicity necessary to support a publication-
of-private-facts claim); Mayer v. Huesner, 107 P.3d 152, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (circulation of 
medical report within company insufficient publicity to support private-facts claim); Myers v. Levy, 
805 N .E.2d 442, 446-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming that a statement by a union official to a 
trade-show official that a business owner was picketing the union's booth was not sufficient 
publicity to support the business owner's false-light-publicity claim against the union official); Dietz 
v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 754 N.E.2d. 958, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding release of former 
employee's credit information by store security manager to two employees did not fulfill publicity 
requirement for private-facts action). 
119 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 520 (2001) (holding that public disclosure of 
telephone conversations about public issues was protected by First Amendment, even though those 
conversations had been illegally intercepted by third parties); Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 
541 (1989) ("[w]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at aU, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the 
highest order ...... ); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) ("Once true information is 
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for 
publishing it."). 
120 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967). 
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therapist's duty to "protect third parties from a threat of serious harm 
posed by a patient under his care," the creation of the "negligent 
infliction of emotional distress" tort, and the allocation of the spousal 
testimonial privilege to the spouse-witness all are common-law 
adjustments, the dynamism of which has not been duplicated by the 
privacy torts. 121 One might anticipate, for example, that a court might 
adjust the publication requirement to allow recovery when even limited 
dissemination, as with personal information, has caused or could cause 
significant damage. This has not occurred. 
Measured by the standards inherent in its creation, the multiple-tort 
approach has failed to meet its adaptive aspirations. 122 Its central 
shortcoming is not simply the inability to generate a fifth privacy tort; it 
is that the four-tort structure has imposed an elemental approach to 
privacy torts in which the central consideration is whether the required 
elements of a specific tort are met, rather than whether the interest to be 
protected has been breached. 123 When these elements preclude 
consideration of the central value to be protected, as Hieu Smith 
discovered, the efficacy of the common-law doctrine, and its ability to 
adapt and evolve, becomes questionable. 124 
III. THE lNTEGRATNE APPROACH OF THE IRISH PRN ACY BILL 
The Irish privacy bill, constructed by a Working Group on Privacy, 
essentially seeks to integrate the unitary- and multiple-tort approaches 
into one statute. 125 It is built on a structure first utilized by the Privacy 
Acts of the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, which recognizes a 
general right to a degree of privacy that is reasonable under the 
circumstances. 126 The Irish proposal joins this understanding to factors . 
to consider in determining whether a breach has occurred, as well as 
recognition of specific types of intrusions, and a list of defenses to create 
a tort intended to be both clear and more flexible. 127 Not only does the 
121 See Madden, supra note 84, at 593-604. 
122 See supra notes 105-121 and accompanying text. 
123 The elemental approach is exemplified by the formulations of the privacy torts laid out in 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (1977). See supra notes 53-56. 
124 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
125 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at app. 
126 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 Ch. 373; Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987 Ch. P125; Privacy Act, 
NFLD. R. S. 1990 Ch. P22; Privacy Act, S.S. 1978 Ch. P-24. 
127 See infra notes 148-170 and accompanying text; see also GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 
17, at'H 6.04(v). 
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proposal integrate the unitary-and multiple-tort approaches, it does this in 
a privacy environment bearing similarities to the American context and 
with the intent to resolve some of the same issues confronting American 
jurisdictions. 
A. THE CONTEXT FOR THE IRISH PRIVACY BILL 
As in the United States, the protection of privacy in the Irish 
Constitution is not explicit. It requires the state to guarantee in its laws to 
defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.128 In 1973, the 
Irish Supreme Court held that this included rights not enumerated in the 
Constitution, including a right to marital privacy.129 Following dictum in 
a 1984 Supreme Court judgment, Ireland's High Court in 1987 declared 
the existence of a general right to privacy. 130 In 1998 the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff in a tort action enjoyed a constitutional right to 
privacy. 131 Thus, while a tort action under the national constitution is not 
available in the United States, it is in Ireland. 132 
An additional layer of concern sterns from a provision in the 
European Convention on Human Rights stating that, "Everyone has the 
right to respect for his family and private life, his home, and his 
correspondence." 133 Ireland's European Convention on Human Rights 
Act, 2003, requires that Irish statutes be interpreted to give effect to the 
Convention and that Irish judges take judicial notice of decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. l34 The Act requires a state organ to 
128 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40(3)(1). 
129 McGee v Attorney General, [1974]I.R. 284 (Ir.) (invoking the right to marital privacy to 
invalidate a ban on importation of contraceptive preparations). 
130 Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36 (lr.) ("It is argued that two personal rights are 
infringed, the right to privacy and the right to bodily integrity. That there are such rights has been 
established. The extent of these rights has still to be ascertained and will vary according to 
circumstances."(citations omitted)); Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland, [1987] I.R. 587 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) 
("Though not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the right of privacy is one of the 
fundamental personal rights of the citizen which flow form the Christian and democratic nature of 
the State."). Note that the High Court functions as an intermediate court of appeal in civil matters. 
See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 34(3-4). 
131 Haughey v. Moriarty, [1999]3 I.R. I (Ir.) ("There is no doubt but that the plaintiffs enjoy a 
constitutional right to privacy."). 
132 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.38. The Irish Constitution, unlike its American 
counterpart, imposes obligations upon its citizens. [d. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922,928-29 (1982) (holding that invocation of the privacy protections of the federal constitution 
requires that an individual be affected by state action); United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, II 
(1883) (stating that the 14th Amendment does not apply to individual invasion of individual rights). 
133 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8.1, Nov. 
4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No.5 (hereinafter European Human Rights Convention). 
134 European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (Act No. 20/2003) (Jr.), art. 2-4. 
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"perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's 
obligations under the Convention's provisions" 135 and permits, when no 
remedy is otherwise available, a suit for damages for anyone who suffers 
injury, loss, or damage as a result of the state's failure to act in accord 
with the Convention. 136 In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled in Von Hannover v. Germany that the obligations of a state under 
the Convention "may involve the adoption of measures designed to 
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of 
individuals between themselves.,,13? The Working Group read Von 
Hannover as strongly suggesting that states have a general obligation to 
introduce measures to protect privacy.138 The problem for Ireland is that 
such protections would be derived from the constitutional guarantees, 
which are themselves unclear. 139 
Ireland thus faces a challenge familiar to American states: how to 
create legal structures that make viable a broadly and amorphously 
defined right. Because Ireland's courts have recognized that a plaintiff in 
a tort action enjoys a constitutional right to privacy,14O and because the 
integration of the European Convention on Human Rights into Ireland's 
national law appears to demand considerably more of Ireland than the 
concept of a right to privacy demands of American states,141 the analogy 
breaks down upon close scrutiny. Nothwithstanding this distinction, in 
both countries the challenge of translating the concept of privacy into 
forms that will facilitate meaningful litigation persists. The Working 
Group observed a number of uncertainties in Ireland, including whether 
causes of action are confined to intentional interferences with the 
constitutional right, and the extent of defenses available. 142 Partly 
stemming from these uncertainties, no case has recognized the 
constitutional protection as supporting a remedy beyond an injunction. 143 
This led the Working Group to conclude that the constitutional protection 
does not "provide a reliable guide by . . . which citizens can predict ... 
whether their action will be found in breach of the law."I44 
Ireland, only fairly recently willing to recognize a common-law 
135 Id. at art. 3, 'II 
136 1d. at art. 3 'll.2 
137 Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-Vl Eur. Ct. H.R. 294 .. 
138 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 3.39. 
139 1d. at'll 3.40. 
140 Haughey v Moriarty, [1999] 3 I.R. I (Ir.). 
141 See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text. 
142 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.37. 
143 1d. at'll 2.39. 
144 Id. at'll 2.42. 
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right to privacy, has, like the United States, attempted to protect privacy 
through ad hoc legislation. 145 These statutes, unlike some of their 
American counterparts,146 do not include provisions authorizing 
damages. As the Irish Working Group report states, such protections are 
piecemeal and do not posit a cause of action for those whose privacy has 
been interfered with. 147 Recognizing the inadequacy of this approach, 
the Irish government has attempted to create the comprehensive cause of 
action that it currently lacks. 
B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR AN OLD TORT 
The Irish Working Group adopted a description of privacy similar to 
the one adopted by the Restatement: "The right of the individual to be 
protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his 
family, by direct physical means or by publication of inforrnation.,,148 
Unlike the Restatement, the Irish bill recognizes a single tort for invasion 
of privacy. 149 More importantly, though, it envisions a single value that 
is breached: the reasonable expectation of privacy. 150 
The Irish proposal provides that "the nature and degree of privacy to 
which an individual is reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is 
reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to the rights of others 
and to the requirements of public order, public morality, and the common 
good." 151 The Working Group concluded that this definition of the scope 
of privacy was a simple, objective test that could be tailored to individual 
situations. 152 The requirement of regard for the rights of others, public 
order, public morality, and the common good incorporates limitations 
raised by the High Court in Cogley v. Radio Telefls Eireann. 153 Cogley 
requires that the right to privacy be analyzed in light of these other 
considerations; thus, the privacy tort requires a court to perform a 
balancing test in determining whether a plaintiff can recover for invasion 
145 See, e.g., Adoption Act, 1976 (Act No. 29/1976) (Ir.) (restricting the publication of public 
records); Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. 37/1976) (Ir.) (requiring state 
broadcasters to not encroach unreasonably on an individual's privacy); Data Protection Act 1988 
(Act No. 2S/l988) (Ir.) (restricting the maintenance and dissemination of personal data by public and 
private entities); see also Gov'T OF IRELAND, supra note 24, at'll 2.19. 
146 See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text. 
147 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 2.18. 
148 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'llI.OS. 
149 Id. at 'll7 .OS, app. § 2( I). 
150 Id. at 'll7 .13, app. § 3( I). 
151 1d. 
152 1d. at'll 7.14. 
153 [200S] IEHC 180 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
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of privacy. 154 In performing this test, a court is required to consider the 
nature of the conduct and the relevant circumstances. ISS 
While the tort is actionable without proof of damages, it is limited 
by the requirement that the conduct be willful and without lawful 
authority or reasonable excuse, as well as its unavailability to corporate 
bodies or to the deceased. 156 The willfulness requirement reflects a 
decision by the Working Group not to extend the tort to negligent or 
inadvertent actions, and the requirement of the absence of lawful 
authority or reasonable excuse accommodates the defenses recognized in 
the bill. 157 
The recognized defenses serve as a further limitation on the 
applicability of the tort. These include protection for persons engaged in 
the lawful defense of person or property, those acting with authorization 
of a statute or pursuant to a court order, and police and public officials 
who reasonably believe their acts are within the scope of their official 
duties. 158 The bill also recognizes a news gathering defense as well as a 
public-interest defense. 159 The news gathering defense is intended to 
prevent the privacy tort from encroaching on the freedom of the press 
required by the European Convention on Human Rights, while the 
public-interest defense is intended to prevent the tort from inhibiting 
"legitimate disclosure of wrongdoing."I60 A notable element running 
through the police/public-official, news gathering, and public-interest 
154 [d. 
155 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.13, app. § 3(2). The relevant circumstances 
include the place where the conduct occurred, the object and occasion of the conduct, the status or 
function of the person alleging a breach of privacy, and the purpose for which any material obtained 
was intended to be used or was actually used. [d. The conceptual basis for such a balancing test was 
explained by Jeremy Bentham in the early nineteenth century. Jeremy Bentham, THEORY OF 
LEGISLATION 93 (Etienne Dumont ed. 1802, translated by R. Hildreth, Trubner & Co., London 
1864). ("[T]he law cannot grant a benefit to one without imposing, at the same time, some burden 
upon another; or in other words, it is not possible to create a right in favour of one, except by 
creating a corresponding obligation imposed upon another. ... The legislator .... [o]ught never to 
impose a burden except for the purpose of conferring a benefit of a clearly greater value."). 
156 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at '11'117.05,7.07, app. §§ 2(1),2(3), 12. 
157 [d. at 'II'lI7 .08, 7.10. 
158 [d. at '117.22, app. §§ (I)(a), 6(1)(b-c). 
159 [d. at '117.22, app. § 6(1)(d) (requiring that the conduct be performed by a person gathering 
news for a newspaper or broadcaster and that such conduct is reasonable and is necessary for or 
incidental to newsgathering activities related to a matter of public interest or fair and reasonable 
comment on a matter of public interest); [d. at '117.25, app. § 7 (protecting disclosures of material that 
is in the public interest or is fair and reasonable comment on a matter of public interest). 
160 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 7.21. See also European Human Rights 
Convention, art. 10.1, ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authorities and regardless of frontiers."). 
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defenses is that the conduct must have been reasonable under the 
circumstances. 161 
The Irish proposal further clarifies the extent of the protection by 
incorporating certain recognized breaches of privacy into the statute. 
The bill provides that the following, proved by preponderance of the 
evidence, are breaches of privacy: surveillance, regardless of the means 
employed or whether accomplished by trespass; disclosure of 
information obtained through surveillance or harassment; unauthorized 
exploitation of the name, likeness, or voice of an identified or 
identifiable individual; and the use of letters, diaries, or other personal 
documents of an individual. 162 The bill clarifies that this section does not 
prejudice the generality of the bill's definition of privacy. 163 
The draft bill seeks to enhance clarity and certainty in an area of the 
law in which current protections are, as in the United States, a 
miscellaneous patchwork. l64 This was motivated in part by a desire to 
comply with the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and to better define how citizens might vindicate their 
constitutional right to privacy.165 The Working Group was also 
concerned, though, with the ability of the case law to respond to 
advances in technology.166 The Group viewed a statutorily created 
general remedy as the best way to counter the use of technology to 
invade privacy, stating that "[s]ectoral legislation dealing with the 
different and myriad forms of abuse of technology cannot be constantly 
renewed by the legislature to keep up with advances in the 
technology.,,167 The Working Group rejected the argument that courts 
should be 'allowed to organically develop the breach-of-privacy tort, 
instead opting for a statutory cause of action that would clarify the law 
and ensure comprehension by lay persons, and that courts could apply in 
specific situations. 168 
The United States and Ireland are, in many respects, very different 
countries. The United States has over 300 million citizens while Ireland 
161 See supra notes 159-160. 
162 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.17, app. § 4(1 )(a-d). 
163 1d. at'll 7.17, app. § 4(1 )(a). 
164 Id. at'll 6.04(iii, vi). See also the discussion on American patchwork protections supra, 
notes 107 to liS and accompanying text. 
165 1d. at 'II 6.04 (vii) (explaining desire to comply with European Convention on Human 
Rights); Id. at 'II 6.04 (ii) (explaining to desire to clarify how citizens may protect their privacy 
rights). 
166 Id. at'll 6.04 (ii). 
167 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 6.04. 
168 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at 'II 6.04(v). 
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has slightly more than four million. 169 While both are democracies, 
Ireland lacks structures analogous to American state governments. 170 At 
the same time, in both countries the extent of tort law's protection of 
privacy is uncertain and is defined by a collection of common-law 
doctrines and statutory provisions. The Irish proposal seeks to give 
greater definition and clarity to this collection and to provide guidance 
for a court's application of the privacy tort to circumstances not 
previously encountered. For this reason, and because it was developed 
free of the heavy influence of the multiple-tort theory, its benefits are 
worthy of consideration in the American context. 
IV. BENEFITS OF THE IRISH lNTEGRATNE APPROACH 
The benefits offered by the Irish proposal can be divided into two 
categories. The first set of benefits is organizational. 171 These are 
related to the ability of the proposed statute to embrace a number of 
disparate elements and to organize them in a coherent manner. The 
second set of benefits is substantive and reflects the ability of the 
proposal to clarify the value underlying privacy torts in a manner that 
will channel the adaptive power of American common law. 172 
A. CLARIFYING AND SIMPLIFYING THE PRN ACY TORT 
Professor Ruth Gavison argued that legislation should create laws 
that are as clear, simple, elegant, and suggestive as possible.173 Elegance 
may be more than one can hope for, but a degree of clarity and 
simplicity, and perhaps even suggestiveness, seems a reasonable 
expectation from a statute. Whatever combination of these factors might 
be possible, Gavison argued that they are necessary for the law to 
perform its function of guiding behavior, providing a basis for 
169 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2006, 583-86 (2006) 
(outlining American government and society); see also id. at 274-77 (doing the same for Irish 
government and society). 
170 Although Ireland is subdivided into twenty-nine counties and five city councils with 
similar powers, their powers do not begin to approach those of American states. Local government 
was not constitutionally recognized until the Twentieth Amendment to the Irish Constitution in 
1999. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 28a. Additionally, while county and city councils do conduct their 
own elections, they occur pursuant to regulations promulgated by a national government minister, 
and their powers are largely determined by acts of the national legislature. See, e.g., Local 
Government Act, 2001 (Act No. 3712001) (Ir.) § 27. 
171 See infra notes 173-186 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text. 
173 See Gavison, supra note 6, at 158. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss1/3
2007] INTEGRATING THE PRIVACY TORT 95 
evaluating conduct, and educating by serving as a means to internalize 
the values of the system. 174 
The most obvious way in which the organizational structure of the 
Irish proposal advances these principles is by bringing the various 
strands of privacy-tort law under the same statutory roof. 175 This 
establishes one place where citizens may discover what their rights are 
when they feel their privacy has been invaded. 176 As the Working Group 
report states, "the encapsulation of a statutory cause of action ... will 
allow the legislature to calibrate the tort in a manner that protects the 
citizen's rights, while at the same time accommodating countervailing 
considerations.,,177 It also simplifies judicial decisionmaking by 
streamlining the sources to which a judge must turn. 178 Additionally, 
once a legislature has enacted a privacy-tort statute, it then has a readily 
available and easily accessible vehicle for future adjustments. 
The reunification of the privacy tort would reverse what Edward 
Bloustein viewed as one of the fundamental problems with the four-tort 
structure: its violation of what he saw as a general principle of science as 
applied to the development of the law. 179 He argued that the four-tort 
structure "offends the primary canon of all science that a single general 
principle of explanation is to be preferred over congeries of discrete 
rules.,,180 He added that, 
To the degree that relief in the law courts can be explained by a 
common rule or principle, to that degree the law has achieved greater 
unity and has become a more satisfying and useful tool of 
understanding. Conceptual unity is not only fulfilling in itself, 
however, it is also an instrument of legal development. 181 
In fulfilling this principle, the Irish structure affords a legislature the 
174 Id. 
175 I.e., definition, principles for determining breach, defenses, recognized defenses. 
176 See GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at en 6.04(iii). 
177 GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at en 6.04(v). 
17S A statutory cause of action allows a judge to look to the statute and then the cases 
construing and applying it when ruling on a case that falls within the statute's parameters, rather than 
having to extrapolate the relevant law from the common law. The efficiency of the Supreme Court 
of California's decisionmaking in determining the extent of the state constitution's privacy 
protection is a good example of the efficiency that is possible when judges can begin with something 
other than the common law. Although not a statute, the constitutional provision was adopted by 
referendum and thus bore at least the same deliberative legitimacy that a statute does. See supra 
notes 64-67 and accompanying text and infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. 
179 Bloustein, supra note 93, at 963. 
ISO Id. 
lSI Id. at 1004. 
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opportunity to make decisions about what will and will not be 
incorporated under the statute. Any of the existing four torts might be 
incorporated as exemplars of transgressions or left out. When 
Wisconsin, for example, enacted its privacy statute in 1977, its 
legislature declined to include the false-light tort. 182 The Wisconsin 
Senate deleted a false-light provision when it passed the privacy statute 
and declined to reinstate it on two subsequent occasions, in part due to 
opposition from the state's communications media. 183 A jurisdiction that 
finds that the false-light-publicity tort is too similar to defamation is free 
to exclude it, as is a jurisdiction that finds that an independent tort for 
misappropriation protects property interests better than the invasion-of-
privacy tort. 184 This would reflect an approach suggested by the 
establishment in the Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition 
of breach of the right to publicity as a separate tort, independent of its 
moorings in privacy. 185 
The tort protection of privacy in both the United States and Ireland 
is a disparate collection of common-law doctrines and statutory 
provisions. 186 A statute of the type proposed in Ireland may not be 
elegant, but it does require a legislature to consider and make decisions 
182 Right of Privacy Act, ch. 176 § 5, 1977 Wis. Laws 756 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 895.50 
(1979». For the legislative history of the statute see Judith Endjean, The Tort of Misappropriation 
of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin's New Privacy Law, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 1029, 1037-40 
(1978). 
183 S. Amend. 9 to Wis. A.B. 216 (1977) (discussed in Jacqueline Hanson Dee, The Absence 
of False Light From the Wisconsin Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 99, 101 (1983»; Right of 
Privacy Act, ch. 176 § 5, 1977 Wis. Laws 756 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 895.50 (1979». For the 
two failed attempts to reinstate the false-light tort, see Wis. A.B. 1224 (1979); and Wis. A.B. 40 
(1981). See also Dee, supra note 6, at 101, for a discussion of the politics behind the debates on the 
false-light provision. 
184 See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002) ("[W]e now decline to 
recognize the tort, concluding that it is highly duplicative of defamation .... "); Lake v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) ("[W]e are not persuaded that a new cause of action 
should be recognized if little additional protection is afforded plaintiffs."); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 
S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. 1994) (rejecting false-light invasion of privacy); Renwick v. News & 
Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.c. 1984); J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 2006, § 5.12(C) (2006) ("[Clourts have yet to draw a clear and distinct line 
between this category of 'privacy' and that of defamation law."). The misappropriation tort's 
protection of a property-like interest has long been grounds for criticism. Harry Kalven argued that 
the appropriation aspect of Warren and Brandeis's 1890 article was "petty." Privacy in Tort Law: 
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326,330 (1966). Others have 
criticized the linking of misappropriation to a property, rather than an "inviolate personality" or 
"dignity," interest. See Bloustein, supra note 109, at 971; Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words 
are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 63, 
III (2003). 
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
186 See supra notes 26-80,107-116,128-147 and accompanying text. 
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that will bring some order and clarity that the current arrangements 
cannot provide. This, in turn, will allow citizens to better understand 
what the tort does and does not protect. By clarifying, in particular, the 
extent to which the current common-law torts are subsumed into the 
newly unified tort, a legislature can clarify the privacy landscape in a 
manner that allows a jurisdiction to avail itself of the proposal's 
substantive benefits. 
B. LINKING THE RE-FORMED TORT TO A CENTRAL VALUE 
The process by which the Irish proposal will achieve its intended 
end is necessarily a political process. 187 It requires a legislature to 
confront fundamental questions related to the protection of privacy, 
including what the term "privacy" is to mean, what kind of defenses will 
be permitted, and what acknowledged transgressions will be integrated 
into the statute. 188 While this necessarily involves concern about the 
impact of special interests, it also raises the possibility of expanding the 
base of parties who contribute to defining the contours of the tort. 189 
Case law develops in response to the facts of individual cases, which 
depend in large part upon those who can afford to bring or defend 
claims. 190 Legislators, however, are responsible to constituents, both as 
individuals and as members of special-interest groupS.191 As a result, the 
statutory route offers the possibility of a privacy tort supported by greater 
187 As in the United States, for the Privacy Bill to be enacted into law it must be passed by 
majorities of both houses of the legislature and signed by the President. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 25(1). 
Although the Irish President is generally apolitical and does not have a veto power, the very nature 
of parliamentary government, especially when the government holds power by virtue of a coalition 
agreement, is inherently political. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 13(3)(2); infra note 197. This is 
exemplified by the absence of any activity on the Privacy Bill after its initial introduction in the 
legislature. See infra notes 195-197 and accompanying text. 
188 The Working Group Report addresses all these concerns. See GOv'T OF IRELAND, supra 
note 17, at 'II 7.05-27. A legislature undertaking to develop a statute based upon the report must 
necessarily make judgments on the conclusions the report reaches in each of these areas. 
189 1d. at 'II 6.04(iii). 
190 Id. at 'II 6.04(iii) (quoting GOV'T OF IRELAND, LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON 
PRlV ACY (LRC 57 -1998) 'II 1.31). 
191 See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 367 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2001) 
("[TJhey will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their 
exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were 
raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their 
title to a renewal of it."); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes. 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 858 (1992) ("Congress is a bureaucratic organization ... generating 
legislation through complicated, but organized, processes of interaction with other institutions and 
groups, including executive branch departments, labor unions, business organizations, and public 
interest groups."). 
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legitimacy and acceptance. 
Beyond greater legitimacy, the Irish statute offers the potential to 
anchor privacy to a reasonably well-articulated value. When the 
Supreme Court of California was confronted with the issue of whether 
the state constitution's privacy protection provided a tort cause of action 
in White v. Davis, it turned, as noted earlier, to a brochure distributed on 
behalf of the initiative through which the language was adopted. 192 
Finding language in the brochure indicating intent to create a tort cause 
of action to protect citizens against invasions of their privacy, the court 
recognized the constitutional privacy tort. 193 The court's analysis was 
simplified because the brochure effectively functioned as the initiative's 
legislative history. 194 With a statute, the citizenry and eventually the 
legislature will presumably set out a more extensive legislative history 
than the brochure analyzed in White. This process has already begun in 
Ireland, where there has been considerable public debate about the 
efficacy of the government proposal. The Irish Journalists Union leapt to 
protest, arguing that the proposed tort was too onerous with respect to 
their work and that it would serve as an unexpected curb on free 
speech. 195 Others raised the concern that the tort was only about the 
protection of politicians and the famous. 196 The question whether the 
government can convince the public that the codification of the invasion-
of-privacy tort benefits the ordinary Irish citizen will ultimately be 
answered in Ireland's Oireachtas (legislature).197 
192 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975). See also supra notes 64-67 and 
accompanying text. 
193 White, 533 P.2d at 234. 
194 Id .. 
195 See Deaglan de Breadun, Legislation Premature and Poorly Drafted, Seminar Told, IRISH 
TIMES (Dublin), September 18,2006, at 5. 
196 See Editorial, Privacy and the Public Interest, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), September 19, 2006, 
at 19. 
197 The proposed statute was introduced in Ireland's Seanad (Senate) on July 7,2006. Privacy 
Bill 2006 (Bill 4412006) (Ir.). On April 29, 2007, the Irish President dissolved the 29th Dail (lower 
house of the legislature) and the 22nd Seanad and called a general election for May 24, 2007. Press 
Release, Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail General Election: 24 May 2007; 30th Dail to meet on 14 
June 2007 (April 30, 2007) (available from Houses of the Oireachtas website) at http: 
http://www.oireachtasjelviewdoc.asp?DocID=7705&&CatID=36. That election saw the Fianna Fail 
party of Taioseach (prime minister) Bertie Ahern, whose government introduced the Privacy Bill, 
gain the largest share of seats, though not a majority, in the 30th Dail. Stephen Collins, Outcome 
Far Closer Than Most Had Predicted, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), May 28, 2007, at 2. When the 30th 
Dail convened on June 14, 2007, Fianna Fail, formed a coalition with the Green Party and the 
Progressive Democrats party that represents a majority of the seats in the Dail. As a result, Bertie 
Ahern was reelected Taioseach. Stephen Collins and Mark Hennessey, Ahern Gives Greens Two 
Top Ministries in Cabinet, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), June 15, 2007, at I. In a uniquely Irish quirk, 
voting for the Seanad does not occur concurrently with voting for the Dail, but within ninety days of 
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While White and the initial public debate in Ireland illuminate some 
of the benefits of a unitary-tort approach, problems can arise when 
guidance to courts is ill-developed. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, which also derived from California's constitutional tort, 
involved a challenge by Stanford University athletes to the legality of the 
NCAA's drug-testing program. 198 In an effort to clarify the 
constitutional cause of action, the Supreme Court of California, left with 
no guidance from the referendum campaign, instead turned to a tortured 
analysis of California and federal cases, as well as the literature on the 
right of privacy going back to Warren and Brandeis. 199 In response, the 
court developed a two-tiered framework of analysis. If a case involves 
the obvious invasion of a fundamental interest, such as freedom from 
involuntary sterilization or freedom to pursue consensual family 
relationships, a compelling interest is required to overcome the vital 
privacy interest.2OO If the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide 
dispute, a general balancing test is used. 201 In an opinion that included, 
among other things, a discussion of the configuration of urinals in a 
men's bathroom, the court upheld the NCAA's drug-testing program, in 
part because fair competition was a legitimate interest and because there 
was a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of the Stanford 
athletes. 202 This holding was rebuked in a dissent by Justice Stanley 
Mosk. 203 In addition to offering further musings on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a locker-room bathroom, he challenged the 
two-tiered analysis as unsupported by the text of the state constitution 
and the history of the referendum that yielded the amendment. 204 Setting 
aside the issue of the wisdom behind the decision, it shows that a vaguely 
the dissolution of the lower house. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 18(8). Voting for the Seanad took place 
on July 23-24, 2007, and the new Seanad convened on September 13, 2007. See Press Release, 
Department of the Environment, Heritage, & Local Government, Seanad General Election (May 5, 
2007) (available from the Department of Environment, Heritage, & Local Government website) at 
http://www.environ.ie/enlLocaIGovernmentlVoting/News/MainBody.5131.en.htm; 187 Seanad Deb. 
Proclamation Summoning Seanad Eireann (September 13, 2007) (available from the Houses of the 
Oireachtas website) at http://debates.oireachtas.ielXm1l30/ SEN20070913.PDF. See also Michael 
O'Regan, Seanad Poll Count Begins Today, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), July 23, 2007, at 7; Jimmy 
Walsh, Ross Stresses Need for Reform as New Cathaoirleach Elected, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), 
September 14,2007, at 13. To date, the Privacy Bill has not been re-introduced in either house of 
the legislature and the new coalition government has given no indication whether it will be. 
198 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994). 
199 ld. at 646-657. 
200 ld. at 653. 
201 1d. 
202 Id. at 655-56. 
203 Hill, 865 P.2d at 679-81. 
204 Id. 
29
Connallon: Integrating the Privacy Tort
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
drawn privacy tort cedes to a court considerable interpretive latitude. 
The legislation proposed by the Irish Government offers the 
opportunity to embrace the more clarifying aspects of the California 
experience while dispensing with some of the more confusing aspects 
manifested in Hill. The proposed statute establishes a privacy tort and 
clarifies the requirements for such a cause of action, thus avoiding the 
tortured discourse of the Hill decision.205 In addition, the sections that 
spell out obvious breaches of privacy and clarify the available defenses 
afford opportunities for further delineation of what is and is not 
actionable. 206 Most importantly, legislative debate requires identification 
of what is at stake, with hopefully greater specificity than seen in 
California.207 Here again, though, actual adoption of a statutory tort will 
establish the act itself as a primary source of authority, with the record of 
the debates a secondary source only where the text of the act is silent or 
unclear. 
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN PRN ACY TORT 
The employment of a statute resembling the Irish proposal is much 
more than an effort to codify the unifying principle claimed to be 
nonexistent by Prosser but acknowledged by Bloustein and others. 208 It 
would also embrace the development of privacy-tort law that has 
occurred in the last four decades. In so doing, a jurisdiction could 
reorient its privacy litigation away from an overly elemental approach 
toward one based upon a broader consideration of what society is 
prepared to protect under the banner of privacy. 
A. STATUTORY UNIFICATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF 
PROTECTION 
The Irish proposal is an exercise in both the general and the 
specific. The right protected is articulated broadly, but the proposal 
provides greater specificity regarding defenses and the list of recognized 
transgressions. 209 The inevitable temptation with such a structure would 
be to announce a general cause of action for invasion of privacy and then 
include in a list of acknowledged transgressions the existing four torts, 
205 See supra notes 148-163 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 64-67, 192-204, and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 49-56, 93-98 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra notes 148-163 and accompanying text. 
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and perhaps some of the mini-torts discussed above. 2IO This might very 
well amount to an exercise hardly worth the effort required. This is not, 
however, what the Irish proposal does. 
First, with respect to the list of violations, two of the acknowledged 
violations-disclosure of information and use of name, likeness or 
voice-sound very much like the Restatement torts of public disclosure 
of private facts and misappropriation. 211 The other two acknowledged 
violations, though, represent two considerations-surveillance and the 
use of letters, diaries, and other personal documents-that do not fit 
conveniently into the Prosser typology. 212 In an American context, the 
temptation to include Prosser torts in such a section would likely be 
irresistible. On the other hand, misappropriation, for instance, might be 
set off on its own, or false-light publicity might be spun off of the 
privacy branch of tort law to live as an aspect of defamation.213 Looking 
forward, a jurisdiction might include the unauthorized dissemination of 
private personal information and unleash the privacy tort on those who 
traffic in personal information.214 Similarly, the incorporation of some of 
the statutorily created tort actions would further define the contours of 
the privacy protection. 215 The enumeration of acknowledged 
transgressions offers an opportunity both to integrate existing torts into 
the broader structure envisioned by the statute and to address methods 
that are obvious violations. While this structure also offers a ready-made 
format for the incorporation of future privacy intrusions into the tort,216 it 
also runs the risk of being so extensively used that it winds up being 
simply a slightly better organized version of the existing structure or a 
glorified Restatement blessed with the imprimatur of legislative 
approval. 
The avoidance of such an outcome rests in the feature that makes 
the proposal worthwhile: its definition of privacy. The articulated cause 
of action simply states that it is a tort to willfully violate the privacy of 
another. 217 It then provides that the "nature and degree of privacy to 
66-67. 
210 See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
211 See GOV'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.17, app. § 4(l)(a-b). See also supra notes 
212 [d. 'lI 7.17, app. §§ 4(l)(a), 4(l)(d). 
213 See supra note 184-185. 
214 The willfulness requirement would act as a limitation on such employment of the statute, 
making it applicable to those who knowingly disseminate personal information, not those who do so 
negligently. 
215 E.g., incorporation into the statute of the tort action for intercepting wireless 
communications. 
216 GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 6.04(iv). 
217 A jurisdiction might be tempted to delete the willfulness requirement to make it more 
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which an individual is reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is 
reasonable in all the circumstances .... ,,218 The statute also includes 
factors to consider in determining what is. reasonable. 219 The most 
important element of the definition, though, so much so that it appears 
twice within nine words, is the element of reasonability.22o 
B. ORIENTING PRIVACY AROUND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
Objective elements in general, and the element of reasonability in 
particular, are not absent in American privacy-tort law. An objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy is a prerequisite for the intrusion-upon-
seclusion tort.221 The public-disc1osure-of-private-facts tort does not 
expressly require a reasonable expectation of privacy, but it does require 
that the disclosure be offensive?22 One might argue that all the elements 
of each of the four torts are geared toward determining the reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but the elements of the four torts make clear that 
they are generally geared toward fulfillment of required elements, not a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, Prosser denies 
the existence of a unifying concept of privacy, so it is logical that there 
would not be a coherent definition. 223 Privacy is different in the 
misappropriation context than in the intrusion-up on-seclusion context. 224 
This suggests that privacy litigation has become almost an exercise in 
code pleading in which the focus is on the fulfillment of specific 
technical requirements rather than on the vindication of an established 
and recognized right. 
The Irish proposal decouples privacy from such a method of 
litigation by positing a one-to-one correspondence between concept and 
useful against, e.g., information traffickers. The problem with this is that it would thereby transform 
the invasion-of-privacy tort into a negligence cause of action. 
218 GOy'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 7.13, app. § 3(1). 
219 [d. at'll 7.13, app. § 3(2). 
220 [d. 'lI 7.13, app. § 3(1). (" ... the nature and degree of privacy to which an individual is 
reasonably entitled to expect [sic] is that which is reasonable in all the circumstances" (emphasis 
added)). 
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
223 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
224 Compare supra notes 53 and 56. By their very terms, the intrusion tort is a breach of 
one's seclusion while the misappropriation tort protects a breach of one's ability to use or benefit 
from one's name or likeness. Compare also supra notes 53 with notes 54 and 55. The act giving 
rise to the intrusion tort is complete upon the breach of another's solitude while the false-light-
publicity and the disclosure-of-private-facts torts require publicity of a private matter before the tort 
is complete. 
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cause of action. 225 This construct by itself, though, is merely a 
manifestation of form. The substance stems from the linkage to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which places that consideration at the 
core of privacy litigation; moreover, that determination is placed in the 
hands of a judge or jury. Including an act among the enumerated 
violation, therefore, must reflect a judgment that the act breaches a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This means, for instance, that the 
listing of misappropriation among the acknowledged violations, as in the 
Irish proposal,226 clarifies that what is breached in that act is privacy, and 
not a vague conception of a property interest. The structure of the 
proposal makes clear that consideration of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy is paramount. 
The use of such a standard with respect to privacy is not without its 
inherent limitations. The Irish proposal contains a number of defenses 
that will bar recovery regardless of whether a reasonable expectation was 
breached. 227 An American jurisdiction need not accept these defenses 
summarily, but they do mirror defenses that have been invoked in the 
United States.228 Additionally, no amount of statutory craftsmanship can 
avoid the impact of the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 229 While a well-constructed statute cannot overcome the 
First Amendment, a state can statutorily create more privacy rights in 
those areas that fall within its powers, which Massachusetts and 
California did by broadening the cause of action. 230 
In addition to these limitations, cases from the Canadian provinces 
225 The Irish proposal is grounded in the notion that it is the responsibility of the legislature to 
craft causes of actions to be enjoyed by citizens. Gov'T OF IRELAND, supra note 17, at'll 6.04(i). The 
Working Group Report perceived that a dedicated cause of action to protect the constitutionally 
protected right to privacy did not exist, and so it recommended that the legislature create one. [d. at 
'116.05. 
226 [d. at'll 7.17, app. § 4(l)(c). 
227 These defenses include acts required by law or court order, acts performed by a police 
officer or officer of the state reasonably perceived to be within the scope of the officer's official 
duties, acts of reasonable news gathering on a matter of public interest, and acts of fair and 
reasonable comment on a matter of public interest. /d. '117.22, app. § 6(1)(a-d). 
228 One who is required to publish matter is absolutely privileged to publish it when it 
represents an invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 592A (1977). A public 
officer acting within the scope of his duties is generally immune from tort liability. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979). The publication of matter reporting on a public meeting is 
privileged if it is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
611 (1977). The contours of America's newsworthiness privilege are murky and vary from state to 
state. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); McCabe v. Village 
Voice, Inc., 550 F. SUpp. 525, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1982); J.e. v. WALA-TV Inc., 675 So.2d 360, 362 
(Ala. 1996); see also supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra notes 62-67, 71-75 and accompanying text. 
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employing statutes similar to the one proposed in Ireland strongly 
suggest that the balancing of the interests of the plaintiff against those of 
the defendant erects a fairly high bar for a claim to clear. 231 The interest 
of a defendant in broadcasting information of public interest, the health 
of employees, and the interest in retrieving documents from a company 
computer all have been sufficient to overcome a plaintiff's interest in 
privacy. 232 The provincial courts have also tended to construe narrowly 
a plaintiff's expectation of privacy in public acts, as well as the definition 
of "willful.,,233 These cases suggest that a jurisdiction seeking to tip the 
scales in favor of plaintiffs would have to take steps to do so, such as by 
including surveillance among the listed violations or by making explicit 
statements about the scope of the protection it seeks to provide. 
The Canadian cases also reveal a method of deciding cases that is 
free of the strictures of the multiple-tort approach. In Genetjanc v. 
Brentwood College Association, a high school student whose headmaster 
entered his home was awarded $2,500 in general damages in a decision 
that balanced the student's significant interest in the privacy of his home 
against the headmaster's insufficient interest in determining whether the 
plaintiff and other students were present.234 In Rideout v. Health 
Labrador Corp., by certifying a class action that included privacy claims 
based on the allegedly improper release of medical information, the court 
simply analyzed the plaintiffs' and defendant's interests, and whether the 
alleged act was willful. 235 In both cases the core analysis was a 
231 See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. 
232 The broadcasting of information of public interest overcame a plaintiffs right to privacy in 
Hollinsworth v. BCTV, [1999] 6 W.W.R. 54 (dismissing plaintiffs privacy claim and holding that 
broadcast of plaintiff undergoing surgery to correct baldness was in public interest); and Doe v. 
Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] 86 B.C.L.R.2d 216 (declining to bar broadcast of interview tapes 
because plaintiff s interest in protecting pri vate facts did not outweigh public interest in integrity of 
newsgathering process). The need to protect the health of employees overcame a plaintiff s right to 
privacy in Peters-Brown v. Regina District Health Board [1996] I W.W.R. 337, affd on other 
grounds [1997]1 W.W.R. 638 (holding that hospital was entitled to inform staff that plaintiff patient 
previously suffered from hepatitis by publishing list in laboratories and emergency department to 
which general public did not have access). In Pacific Northwest Herb Corp. v. Thompson, [1999] 
B.C.J. No. 2272, the right to access private documents was sufficient to forestall an injunction to 
enjoin an employee from accessing personal documents on a company-owned computer used by 
defendant in his home. 
233 See Druken v. R.G. Fewer & Assocs. Inc., [1998] Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 312 (holding video 
surveillance of plaintiff and child in yard readily visible to passersby did not violate Privacy Act); 
Silber v. British Columbia Television Broad. Co., [1985] 25 D.L.R.4th 345 (dismissing breach of 
privacy action arising from videotaping of events occurring in parking lot visible to passers by); see 
also Peters-Brown, supra note 232 (holding that "willful" requires more than intentional behavior; it 
requires an intent to violate the plaintiff s privacy). 
234 Genetjanc v. Brentwood Coil. Assn., [2001] B.C.S.C. 822, 'Il'll17-26. 
235 Rideout v. Health Labrador Corp., [2005]2005 NLTD 116, 'Il'll50-65. 
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balancing of the parties' interests, leading to damages and certification of 
a class to pursue a claim that would likely be outside the American four 
tort structure.236 Such an approach would free privacy tort from the 
elemental constraints of the four torts and allow application of the 
privacy tort to circumstances not generally permitted by the Restatement 
elements. 237 
This orientation of privacy litigation to the reasonable expectation 
of privacy offers the possibility of simplifying privacy litigation. It does 
not change, however, the fundamental requirement of proving one's case 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 238 A plaintiff would still need to 
convince a judge or jury that he or she had an expectation of privacy 
society regards as reasonable that had been breached. 239 Similar 
approaches have been seen with respect to negligence240 and Fourth 
Amendment search-and-seizure privacy?41 To the extent that the change 
236 Rideout, [2005] 2005 NLTD 116, 'Il'II 57-63, 140; Genet jane. [2001] B.C.S.C. 822. 'Il'II 22-
26.36. 
237 Andrew McClurg suggests, e.g .• that one of the chief obstacles to the application of the 
appropriation tort to consumer data profiling is the limitation of the ton to appropriation of name or 
likeness only. McClurg, supra note 229. at 141. The Irish statute suggests, however, that the central 
inquiry should be the consumer's reasonable expectation of privacy in the information balanced 
against the interests of the defendant in his action. GOY'T OF IRELAND, supra note 22, at app. § 3( I). 
While the recognized violation in the Irish statute is limited to appropriation of name, likeness, or 
voice, these provisions are without prejudice to the statute's broad definition of privacy. [d. at 'II 
7.17, app. § 4(1). 
238 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. 
240 Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1982) ("It must bear on what is reasonable 
conduct under all the circumstances, the quintessential test of negligence."); Freeman v. Adams, 218 
P. 600, 60 I (Cal. Ct. App. 1923) ("In determining what a reasonable and prudent man would do 
under the circumstances you will remember that presumably a jury is composed of such reasonable 
and prudent persons .... "); Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.) ("[w]e ought 
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary 
prudence would observe."); Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club (1933) I K.B. 205 (Eng.) ("The 
reasonable man has been described as .. .'the man in the street' or 'the man in the Clapham omnibus,' 
or. .. the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawnmower in his shin 
sleeves."'); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283 (1964) ("Unless the actor is a child, the 
standard of conduct to which he must conform... is that of a reasonable man under the 
circumstances."). 
241 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (declining to apply the exclusionary 
rule to evidence seized in objectively reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment protection 
requires "that the expectation [of privacy] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable."'); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 969 (1st. Cir. 1995) ("Probable cause will be 
found to have been present if the officers ... possessed reasonably trustworthy information sufficient 
to warrant a prudent policeman in believing that a criminal offense had been or was being 
committed."); United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931,934 (6th Cir. 1990) (defining probable cause 
as "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere 
suspicion."). 
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contemplated would compel litigants to make a connection between their 
position and what society expects, privacy-tort law may more efficiently 
and more fairly fulfill the goals of tort law to vindicate individual rights 
and to deter socially unacceptable behavior. 242 
If the privacy tort were tied to a more elastic understanding of the 
protection it offers, courts would be better able to apply the tort to a 
range of circumstances beyond those contemplated by the four torts. The 
idea of privacy, tort or otherwise, has always been conditioned by the 
challenges posed by changes in society, including the development of 
technology,243 but it is unreasonable to expect privacy-tort jurisprudence 
to continue to meet challenges with a rigid, almost five-decade-old 
structure. 
The impact of technology on privacy is not a new concern. Warren 
and Brandeis in 1890 decried the impact of "instantaneous photographs" 
and "numerous mechanical devices" that threatened to make private 
matters public.244 Over eight decades later, in 1971, Professor Arthur R. 
Miller contemplated the impact of computer technology on privacy.245 
More recently, Miller considered the implications of cookies, electronic 
commerce, and the collection and dissemination of personal 
information. 246 In the not-too-distant future he might reasonably 
contemplate the widespread availability of imagery from high-resolution 
satellite cameras in real time in addition to a range of threats that are as 
beyond our imagination now as identity theft was a generation ago. 
The ability of the common law to respond to such threats is unclear. 
Matthew Keck argued that his proposed information-privacy tort was an 
extension of the common law, but its narrow applicability to internet 
privacy quickly begins to bear a striking resemblance to the piecemeal 
protections discussed earlier. 247 Professor Jessica Litman, looking to the 
invasion-of-privacy tort to protect personal information, concluded that it 
242 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 901(c) (1979). 
243 See Gonnley, supra note 45, at 1434, 1440 
244 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 213. 
245 ARTHUR R. MILLER, AsSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS 
10-16 (1971). 
246 Alison Bass, Miller's Privacy Warning, CIO MAGAZINE, November 2001, available at 
http://www.cio. comJarchive/llOlOl/miller.htmi. 
247 Matthew Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for the 
Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 107-116 (2002). Considerations 
relevant to Keck's proposed tort are the reasonable expectation of privacy, the purpose of the 
transfer of information, the nature of the information, and the seriousness of the violation. Id. at 116. 
See also supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of American piecemeal 
protections. 
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was too narrowly defined to serve its purpose.248 The ongoing march of 
technology and society seems likely to render the existing structure less 
effective. If the real-time satellite imagery scenario contemplated above 
comes to pass, rather than having the success of a privacy-tort claim 
hinge on whether a plaintiff files an intrusion or a private-facts claim, the 
reasonable-expectation construct would allow a court to evaluate the 
facts against what society may reasonably be expected to protect and 
then rule accordingly. This application of established norms to emerging 
contexts is the core of the development of the common law.249 It is what 
Hieu Smith expected of that federal court in Colorado in 1990, and it is 
what the privacy tort created by the Irish proposal offers. 250 Because of 
this, the Irish proposal portends the possibility of a more resilient privacy 
tort than that which is currently available. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislation may seem an odd method for strengthening a common-
law tort. The impact of the Restatement, though, has stunted the ability 
of the common law to do this with respect to privacy?51 If the drafters of 
the Restatement intended that their work would facilitate an ongoing 
engagement that would serve to further develop tort protections of 
privacy, this aspiration remains unfulfilled. Rather than defining the 
current core of privacy-tort law, the four torts have come to largely 
define its parameters. 
The four-tort structure has, therefore, become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. By denying a central value to the invasion-of-privacy tort and 
conceiving of it as a loose federation of four torts, the framework has 
necessitated the creation of new torts for breaches of privacy that fall 
outside the four-tort structure. 252 Each new tort, in turn, furthers the 
notion that tort protection of privacy can only be accomplished by a 
series of piecemeal protections. As this occurs, though, it undermines 
the viability of privacy as an independent concept by diffusing the 
248 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1302-
04 (2000); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609,1634 (1999) (arguing that common-law limitations render state tort laws a weak response to 
electronic threats to information privacy); Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in 
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 209-212 (Phillip E. Agre & Marc 
Rotenberg eds., 1997) (concluding tort remedies do not adequately address privacy concerns with 
respect to computer technology). 
249 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 148-160 and accompanying text. 
251 2 . See supra notes 81-1 7 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 49-56,107-115 and accompanying text. 
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protections the law provides across an increasing number of torts. This, 
in turn, necessitates a dependence on legislatures to keep up with new 
invasions of privacy through the enactment of new torts to cover them. 253 
The Irish proposal offers a framework that strengthens the identity 
of privacy as an independent, relevant tort concept by establishing a 
single privacy tort and defining it according to reasonable expectations 
under prevailing circumstances. 254 This anchors privacy-tort law to an 
understanding similar to that to which constitutional search-and-seizure 
privacy law is grounded, or to another legislatively determined value. 255 
Additionally, by allowing for integration of developments of the 
common law into the statute, the Irish proposal creates a ready-made 
framework for the confrontation of new privacy invasions by allowing a 
cause of action to be based on whether the new invasion breaches a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.256 This relieves legislatures of the 
need to keep up with new challenges to privacy. The Irish statute offers 
courts a unified, clear articulation of the invasion-of-privacy tort that is 
elastic enough to incorporate the common law and channel its tort 
protection of privacy to a more effective future. 
• 
253 See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 100-102, 240 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text. 
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